Buffalo Law Review
Volume 42

Number 3

Article 7

10-1-1994

The RTC Intrusion into Bankruptcy: A Crisis Solution at the
Expense of Equity?
Hope W. Olsson

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Hope W. Olsson, The RTC Intrusion into Bankruptcy: A Crisis Solution at the Expense of Equity?, 42 Buff. L.
Rev. 893 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol42/iss3/7

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

The RTC Intrusion into Bankruptcy:
A Crisis Solution at the Expense of Equity?
HOPE W. OLSSONt
INTRODUCTION

The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act of 1989 (FIRREA)' granted broad powers to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Resolution Trust Corporation
(RTC) to resolve failed savings institutions. The Act provided for
three separate entities with distinct responsibilities for dealing with
the extraordinary crisis in this important segment of the financial
industry. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) was established as
an office within the Department of the Treasury with the primary
responsibility for regulating both federal and state-chartered savings associations. 2 Responsibility for insuring savings institutions
remained with the FDIC,' and the RTC was established as a temporary agency, acting as conservator or receiver to manage and resolve
insolvent savings associations. 4
A significant component of this overall scheme was the granting of a broad range of powers to the RTC for use in its capacity as
conservator or receiver. At the time of appointment as conservator or
receiver, the agency gains several "superpowers" granted to further
the overall goals of insuring a healthy banking system and minimizing the ultimate cost to taxpayers.5 This Comment examines several
of these broad grants of power, specifically as they relate to the
scope and the methodologies of bankruptcy proceedings.
t J.D., 1994, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12

U.S.C.).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1462 (Supp. V 1993).
3. Paul T. Clark et al., Regulationof Savings Associations Under the FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 BUS. LAW 1013, 1026-27
(1990).
4. 12 U.S.C. § 1441 (Supp. V 1993). This law grants the same powers of conservatorship and receivership to the RTC that are already held by the FDIC, but only for a temporary period. "All of the responsibilities of the RTC are, however, actually performed by the
FDIC, and the board of directors of the FDIC also serves as the board of directors of the
RTC." Vicki 0. Tucker et al., The RTC: A Practical Guide to the Receivership/ ConservatorshipProcess and the Resolution of Failed Thrifts, 25 U. RICH. L REV. 1,
1-2 (1990).
5. For a summary of powers granted to the RTC, see Tucker et al., supra note 4, at
1-3, 24-30.
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The first section explores the extension of RTC powers into areas normally governed by the bankruptcy framework and the implications for creditors of vulnerable organizations. The following section discusses the fact that the RTC has taken an aggressive approach to the implementation of FIRREA, using its powers to the
fullest extent in the bankruptcy context. Part Three examines the
anti-injunction provision of FIRREA,6 which the RTC has implemented as a tool to avoid or resolve jurisdictional conflicts with
bankruptcy proceedings. Finally, this Comment concludes that the
expansion of RTC superpowers at the expense of the reliability of
the bankruptcy system risks creating future problems as serious as
the crisis FIRREA was implemented to resolve.
I. EXTENSION OF RTC POWERS INTO TRADITIONAL
BANKRUPTCY FRAMEWORK

A.

Background
The thrift industry, comprised of savings and loan associations,
has traditionally served as the primary financing vehicle for residential housing.7 Prior to 1980 thrift institutions were funded primarily through deposit accounts; other investments were generally
limited to government securities.' The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA)9 and the
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982"0 significantly
"deregulated" the thrift industry." Savings institutions subsequently entered into more speculative ventures, such as commercial
6. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (Supp. V 1993).
7. Clark et al., supranote 3, at 1016.
8. Id.
9. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) (removing constraints on interest rate ceilings on deposits, raising federal deposit
insurance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000, and authorizing investment in open-end investment companies, corporate debt securities and commercial paper).
10. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.) (broadening the range of investment vehicles available to savings institutions and
establishing a capital assistance program for augmenting net worth).
11. Clark et al.,
supra note 3, at 1019-21. Prevailing interest rates soared above
ceilings set for savings associations, and many depositors shifted funds to money market
mutual funds. DIDMCA phased out interest rate ceilings on deposits and raised deposit
insurance coverage from $40,000 to $100,000. To remain competitive, institutions were
forced to pay higher interest rates on deposits. With loan portfolios invested in long-term,
fixed-rate mortgage loans, many savings associations experienced significant losses.
Garn-St. Germain authorized savings association investment up to ten percent of assets
in commercial and agricultural loans, permitted loans secured by nonresidential real estate to climb to forty percent of assets, and provided a program whereby associations
could issue capital notes to the FSLIC to augment net worth. Many states also expanded
lending and investment powers for state-chartered savings associations. Id.
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real estate development. 12
As the character of the industry changed and regulatory scrutiny diminished, thrift institutions became vulnerable to mismanagement, fraud, insider abuse and the vagaries of volatile interest
rates and shifting economic policy. 3 Between 1980 and 1988, over
500 savings associations failed and the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) became insolvent. 14 A Congressional
attempt to recapitalize the FSLIC in 19871 was not successful in
preventing a crisis, and by 1988 it was obvious that a comprehensive
legislative approach to resolving the problems of the thrift industry
would be required.' 6 FIRREA was enacted in 1989 for the specific
purposes of resolving failures of savings associations, recapitalizing
the deposit insurance fund, "re-regulating" the thrift industry, and
preventing future insolvencies.'
Since the enactment of FIRREA, the courts have found it necessary to more precisely define the RTC's powers as a conservator or
receiver' 8 -a role most commonly associated with the bankruptcy
system. The intrusion of the RTC into the traditional bankruptcy
sphere has created a jurisdictional conflict. The relationship between the RTC "superpowers" and the jurisdictional authority of
bankruptcy courts has faced continuing challenge in the courts.
B.

Bankruptcy Proceedings

Bankruptcy cases are essentially proceedings in equity, and
traditionally bankruptcy courts have decided all issues in a case,
whether legal or equitable. The United States Constitution provides
for "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the

12. Id. at 1021.
13. Id. at 1020-23.
14. Id. at 1013-14.

15. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552
(codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (providing for recapitalization of FSLIC,
regulatory authorization for capital forbearance for savings associations, and authorization for the purchase of capital certificates and warrants from undercapitalized institu-

tions participating in a capital recovery plan).
16. Clark et al., supra note 3, at 1014-15.
17. Id. at 1015 (citing H.R. REP. No. 222, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1989), reprinted
in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432; S. REP. No. 19, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1989)).
18. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)-(e) (Supp. V 1993) specify the powers and duties of the RTC

as conservator or receiver. The RTC is authorized to succeed to all rights and obligations
of the institution and to take any action it deems in the best interest of the institution,
the depositors, or the FDIC, to take such action necessary to put the institution in a
sound and solvent condition, or to liquidate the institution and sell its assets. Id.
Of particular concern is the power to repudiate burdensome contracts or leases provided in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1); see infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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United States," 9 and the bankruptcy body of law has developed in
an evolutionary fashion. 0
In recent years, Congress has sought to promote reorganization
as a preferable alternative to liquidation, in keeping with the underlying goals of bankruptcy policy."' The reorganization option has
provided an equitable legal alternative for businesses in distress.
The bankruptcy forum is a collective approach to negotiation and
problem-solving that can benefit vulnerable organizations while
providing predictability and confidence in the creditor community.
The equitable bankruptcy doctrine has been effective in serving the
dual policy objectives of a "fresh start" for the debtor and fair treatment of all creditors.
C.

JurisdictionOverlap

Historically, bankruptcy court jurisdiction has been difficult to
define. Clearly establishing the limits of bankruptcy jurisdiction has
22
proved an elusive task and has generated considerable litigation.
In an attempt to settle bankruptcy jurisdiction issues, the 1978
Bankruptcy Code created a comprehensive grant of jurisdiction to
bankruptcy courts.23 The Bankruptcy Code was amended in 1984,14
creating a complex system which differentiates between "core" and
"non-core" proceedings.2 Actions which reach the property of an es19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
20. For a discussion of the historical background and analysis of the development of
bankruptcy law, see 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTcy

1.02-1.03 (15th ed. 1994).

21. Sandra E. Mayerson, Reform Bill is Dangerous Electioneering, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
31, 1992, at 14 (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 230 (1977), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.CAN. 5963, 6179).
22. Ronald W. Goss, Defining The Scope of Retained Jurisdiction in Chapter 11
Plans, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 1-2, 2 n.4 (1992) ("The entire history of bankruptcy law is filled
with attempts to define the limits of the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction. Commentary on
the scope of preconfirmation jurisdiction... became practically a cottage industry during
the past decade.")(emphasis omitted); see also Philip J. Hendel & Joseph H. Reinhardt,
Attempting to Define the Scope of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction:No Miracle Drugs for
the Patient, 92 COMi. L.J. 350 (1987); Melodie Freeman-Burney, JurisdictionUnder the
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984: Summing Up the Factors, 22 TULSA L.J. 167, 169-72
(1986).
23. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
24. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)-(4) (1988); see generally Ronald W. Goss, Defining The
Scope ofRetained Jurisdictionin Chapter 11 Plans, 18 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 7-9 (1992). The
bankruptcy court is a unit of the district court, with conferral of jurisdiction on the district court entity. The district court may refer bankruptcy cases and proceedings to bankruptcy judges. A bankruptcy judge exercises complete adjudicatory powers over "core"
proceedings, but has only the power to submit proposed findings and conclusions to the
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tate when the bankruptcy case commences are core proceedings,
over which a bankruptcy judge exercises complete adjudicatory powers. 26 With the enactment of this legislation, Congress clearly intended to "provide bankruptcy judges with the necessary tools to
handle27 most matters arising in, under, or related to a bankruptcy
case."
The powers granted to the RTC in the 1989 FIRREA legislation
have created an overlap with the scope of jurisdiction contemplated
under the bankruptcy scheme. The difficulties caused by this overlap arise in the context of business organizations that are subsidiaries or affiliates of failed savings institutions. When such a business
organization files a petition for protection in a bankruptcy court, the
question becomes whether bankruptcy jurisdiction controls the administration of the case or is superseded by specific grants of power
to the RTC.
The unresolved issues are priorities and overall goals. Should
the RTC have access to these organizations as thrift assets, or
should the business organization be permitted to proceed under
Chapter 11 reorganization for the benefit of all creditors? Should the
RTC have the power to retrieve assets from Chapter 11 protection?
The answers will ultimately have a profound effect on the viability
of such businesses, the manner in which they operate, and their relationships with creditors and other business concerns. The answers
to these questions may have an even greater impact in future years.
The lessons we learn while resolving the savings institution crisis
may determine how we structure solutions to future crises.
Central to the jurisdictional problem is section 1821Q)2" of FIRREA, the "so-called anti-injunction provision."29 This provision presents a potential conflict with the bankruptcy system's broad grant
of jurisdiction under § 133430 and the automatic stay provision of
district court in "non-core," or related, proceedings. Core proceedings include matters
such as "traditional bankruptcy proceedings[,] ...matters concerning administration of
the estate, [and] automatic stay litigation"; 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) provides a non-exclusive
list of core proceedings. Id. at 8-9. Non-core proceedings are "civil proceedings that, in the
absence of a bankruptcy petition, could have been brought in a district or state court." Id.
at9.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This section provides that "ltihe district
court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending shall have exclusive ju-

risdiction of all of the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement
of such case, and of property of the estate." Id.
27. Hendel & Reinhardt, supra note 22, at 365.
28. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (Supp. V 1993).
29. Karen Donovan, Courts Prop Up Receivers' Powers Under Bailout Law, NAT'L

L.J., Sept. 28, 1992, at 21.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (1988). Subsection (a)provides that "[elxcept as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, the district courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdic-
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§ 362. 3 ' FIRREA's § 1821(j) provides: "Except as provided in this
section, no court may take any action, except at the request of the
Board of Directors by regulation or order, to restrain or affect the
exercise of powers
or functions of the Corporation as a conservator
" 2
or a receiver.

3

An example of this jurisdictional dilemma and the far-reaching
impact of the conflict can be found in a 1992 case In re Landmark
Land Co. of Oklahoma.33 The principal assets in dispute were resorts owned by subsidiaries of the failed Oak Tree Savings Bank of
New Orleans.3 4 The failed bank was the sole shareholder in Clock
Tower Place Investments, Ltd., which in turn owned the majority
stock in five subsidiary Landmark Land companies.3 5 Two days after
tion of all cases under title 11." Id.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)),
operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been commenced
before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case
under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property
of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against
the debtor, and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Id. The automatic stay is part of the very foundation of the bankruptcy structure, providing a breathing spell for debtors and an equitable treatment of all creditors. It encourages
negotiation and the realistic assessment of the interests of all parties.
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (Supp. V 1993).
33. 973 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1992).
34. Id. at 286.
35. Id. The five subsidiary companies were: Landmark Land Company of Oklahoma,
Inc., Landmark Land Company of Carolina, Inc., Landmark Land Company of California,
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Clock Tower and its subsidiaries asked for protection under Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Office of Thrift Supervision appointed RTC as Oak Tree's receiver and chartered a new institution
(New Oak Tree), which purchased RTC's rights to all of Oak Tree's
assets.3 6
The District Court of South Carolina determined that subsidiary business enterprises which have sought reorganization under
Chapter 11 may be irreparably harmed if the RTC, as liquidating
receiver, withdrew them from bankruptcy and sold the assets to the
detriment of creditors." The district court noted that it had jurisdiction to prevent interference with debtors' rights to reorganize and
to protect the interests of other creditors." Concluding that the proceedings constituted core proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code,
the court determined that bankruptcy court "has exclusive jurisdiction and power over the disposition of all of the assets of Plaintiffs'
estates, as debtors and debtors in possession."39
The ruling specifically concluded that "[t]his Court has a duty
to protect Plaintiffs' property for the benefit of all creditors and
other parties-in-interest, including the RTC-Conservator, in the reorganization process and to prevent interference with and control
over the reorganization process of the Plaintiffs by any other
party."40 The district court issued an injunction, stating that the interests of all parties would be best served if Landmark continued to
manage the assets under the supervision of the court, rather than
allowing the RTC to exercise exclusive control over the assets.4 The
court's reasoning was that the RTC, in its role as creditor and
shareholder, should not be in a position to control liquidation or reorganization to the detriment of other creditors.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and allowed the
Inc., Landmark Land Company of Florida, Inc., and Landmark Land Company of Louisiana, Inc. Id. n.1. The subsidiaries' substantial estates had an aggregate value of approximately one billion dollars ($1,000,000,000) in assets. In re Landmark Land Company of
Carolina, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18145, at *4 (D.S.C. 1991). The major assets were six
prime golf resort communities, including Palm Beach Polo and Country Club in Florida,
PGA West in La Quinta, California, and Ocean Course at Kiawah Island in South Carolina. The five subsidiary companies developed, owned, and managed the resort residential
communities. Along with golf courses, the developments included tennis and polo facilities to which memberships were sold. Landmark of Oklahoma, 973 F.2d at 286; Bill Atkinson, Landmark Loses Control of Golf Courses to RTC, THE AM. BANKER, Aug. 20, 1992,
at 2.
36. Landmark of Oklahoma, 973 F.2d at 287.
37. Landmark of Carolina,1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18145, at *5.
38. Id. at *7.
39. Id.
40. Id. at *8.
41. Id. at *6. The injunction prevented the RTC from calling a shareholders' meeting
to elect new directors to the subsidiaries' boards. Id. at *3.
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RTC to invoke the statutory anti-injunction provision.42 Paying
minimal attention to the rights of other creditors, the court reasoned
that Congress created injunctive protection for the RTC to prevent
equitable interference with the exercise of RTC's full powers.43 In the
circuit court's opinion, parties aggrieved by RTC actions would have
recourse through the administrative claims process of FIRREA.44
The difficulty with this approach, however, is that the claims process applies only to receiverships, not to conservatorships 5 The court
"assum[ed] a remedy where none exists," and left "4,500 creditors
and 18,000 homeowners and members of Landmark communities... [w]ithout access to the judicial system to protect their rights,
they [were] left at the mercy of the RTC."46
The Fourth Circuit did not distinguish between ownership of
the shares of subsidiaries (assets of the failed thrift) and ownership
of assets of the subsidiaries (property of the debtors' estates)." The
district court had specifically addressed this critical issue:
The RTC-Conservator has no direct ownership of, or interest in, the
Plaintiffs' estates. The RTC-Conservator enjoys no greater status as a
shareholder than any other shareholder of a debtor in a Chapter 11 proceeding. The RTC-Conservator takes the ownership of the stock... as it
found it on October 13, 1991; i.e., the common stock of an insolvent entity
in Chapter 11 proceedings, the assets and business of which are subject to
the jurisdiction of this Court.
This court is called upon to balance the rights, powers and duties of the
OTS and the RTC to take over an insolvent savings and loan institution,
and to carry out their respective statutory functions of collecting obligations and liquidating assets. The only asset subject to liquidation by the
RTC-Conservator is the common stock of Clock Tower which, in all probability, has no value. These powers are to be balanced with the power of
the Bankruptcy Court to oversee the affairs of the debtor, including the
payment of creditors of these Plaintiffs in accordance with the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code. Congress has vested exclusive jurisdiction over
42. Landmark of Oklahoma, 973 F.2d at 290.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 288.
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(11) (Supp. V 1993); see also John L. Douglas, RTC's Receivership Powers Reviewed, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1992, at 16, 18 [hereinafter Douglas,
RTC's Powers] (pointing out that the claims process was established for claims against a
failed savings institution, not for claims against a subsidiary that is a business
organization in conservatorship status involved in reorganization proceedings. There is
no provision for claims against institutions in conservatorship. The administrative claims
process provides only for monetary relief in receivership situations where the institution
is undergoing liquidation).
46. Douglas, RTC's Powers,supranote 45, at 21.
47. Alan B. Miller & Jeffrey L. Tanenbaum, How 4th Circuit Went Beyond MCorp,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 16, 1992, at 16,20 [hereinafter Miller & Tanenbaum, Beyond MCorp].
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the affairs of corporate debtors with the bankruptcy court, not the OTS or
the RTC. Similarly, Congress vested exclusive jurisdiction over the affairs

institutions with the OTS and the RTC, not
of insolvent savings and loan
48
with the Bankruptcy

Court.

In contrast, the circuit court relied heavily upon congressional
intent and broad policy objectives of the FIRREA legislation, examining the provision in light of its context within the entire legislative
package:
FIRREA is also intended to improve the distinction "between the regulatory and insurance fimctions of the thrift industry by (1) ensuring a well
capitalized and independent thrift insurance fund, (2) enhancing thrift industry regulation by providing for stronger supervisory oversight of the
industry under the Department of Treasury; establish stronger capital
standards for thrifts; and, enhance the regulatory enforcement powers of
the depository institution49 regulatory agencies to protect against fraud,

waste and insider abuse."

The power of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision 0
was diluted as the court found that the RTC was "well within its
statutory authority to take control... without interference by the
bankruptcy or district court."51 By invoking the anti-injunction provision, the RTC could immediately exercise its ownership rights,
taking managerial control of the subsidiaries. The properties remained under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, but the RTC
was now in the position of approaching the bankruptcy court as
owner and manager. Without managerial control, the RTC would
have been recognized by the bankruptcy court as just another
creditor that had a claim against the bankruptcy estate. The Landmark ruling is thus a "blow to creditors because it enables the RTC
to take control of thrift subsidiaries' assets and sell them even if little or nothing is left over for creditors."5 2
II. THE RTC's AGGRESSIVE STANCE

A.

In General

As the FIRREA legislation is interpreted through litigation, the
RTC is aggressively attempting to establish a line of cases expanding its powers in relation to bankruptcy proceedings. The foundation
for this approach is the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Board of
48. Landmark of Carolina,1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18145, at *7-9.
49. Landmark of Oklahoma, 973 F.2d at 286 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 54, Part 1,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. 291, 307-08 (1989), reprintedin 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 87, 103-04).
50. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
51. Landmark of Oklahoma, 973 F.2d at 290.
52. Atkinson, supra note 35, at 2.
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Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. MCorp Financial.3
MCorp., a bank holding company, voluntarily sought protection under Chapter 11 and obtained a preliminary injunction preventing
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from prosecuting two pending administrative proceedings. 4 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit in holding that the plain language
of § 1818(i)(1) 55 is not superseded by the automatic stay provision of
the Bankruptcy Code because § 362(b)(4) "expressly provides that
the automatic stay will not reach proceedings to enforce a
'governmental unit's police or regulatory power.' "56
There is, however, a crucial difference between MCorp and the
position adopted in Landmark. In MCorp the Supreme Court upheld
use of the blocking mechanism to preclude early intrusion by the
judicial system in the administrative process, whereas in Landmark
the Fourth Circuit withdrew the judicial system from any review of
administrative action by assuming an alternate remedy where none
57
exits.
In the Fourth Circuit the RTC has also established that thrift
holding companies cannot shield assets or avoid obligations by filing
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. This was accomplished in two
related cases, both decided in 1992: Carlton v. Firstcorp8 and In re
5 9 Firstcorp was
Firstcorp.
a holding company that owned two thrift
institutions, the financially sound First Federal Savings and Loan
Association of Durham and First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Raleigh, which was in federal receivership due to its insolvency.6" When the Raleigh institution was placed in receivership, the
Office of Thrift Supervision charged Firstcorp with responsibility for
the $45 million capital requirement upon which its acquisition of
Raleigh in 1985 had been conditioned." In the first of two relevant
53. 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).

54. Id. at 461.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (Supp. V 1993). Although § 1821() is the provision generally referred to as FIRREA's anti-injunction provision, § 1818(i)(1) has been employed in a
similar fashion, providing: "no court shall have jurisdiction to affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to review,
modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order." Id.
56. MCorp, 112 S.Ct. at 464. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) provides: "The filing of a petition
...does not operate as a stay-.... (4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power." See supra note 31 for the text of
subsection (a)(1).
57. Douglas, RTC's Powers, supra note 45, at 19.
58. 967 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1992).
59. 973 F.2d 243 (4th Cir. 1992).
60. Carlton,967 F.2d at 943.
61. Id.; see also RTC Wins in Three Bankruptcy Disputes, 3 RESOLUTION TR. REP.,
Aug. 24, 1992, at 10.
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Firstcorp decisions the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court's
finding that FIRREA's § 1818(i)(1) superseded the Bankruptcy
Code's automatic stay provision. 62 Building upon the foundation laid
down by the Supreme Court in MCorp,63 the court expanded the
application of § 1818(i)(1) in determining that the bankruptcy automatic stay applies to neither a temporary cease and desist order nor
an OTS enforcement action requiring Firstcorp to transfer assets of
the bankruptcy estate." The court stated that these FIRREA provisions "present a unified regulatory scheme which under MCorp is
free from the intrusion of bankruptcy's automatic stay."65
In the latter of the two Firstcorp cases, the Fourth Circuit
found that a holding company cannot escape its obligation under a
capital maintenance agreement by filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 6 The holding company, Firstcorp, was required to "forgive
intercompany indebtedness owed [by the subsidiary] and to
'downstream' a valuable asset to its failing subsidiary"6 7 -i.e., assets
had to be used to satisfy capital maintenance obligations of a subsidiary in receivership before reorganization.'
In particular, the circuit court construed § 365(o) of the Bankruptcy Code.6 9 This section provides:
In a case under chapter 11 of this title, the trustee shall be deemed to
have assumed,

...

and shall immediately cure any deficit under, any

commitment by the debtor to ... the Director of the Office of Thrift Suor its predecessors ... to maintain the capital of an insured
pervision...
depository institution .... 70
The court examined the question of congressional intent, stating
that "Congress sought 'to prevent institution-affiliated parties from
using bankruptcy to evade commitments to maintain capital reserve
requirements of a Federally insured depository institution,' "71 and it
specifically stated that the "assumption and obligation to cure occur
62. Carlton,967 F.2d at 945-46.
63. 112 S. Ct. 459 (1991).
64. Carlton, 967 F.2d at 945-46.
65. Id. at 946.
66. Firstcorp,973 F.2d at 244.
67. Miller & Tanenbaum, Beyond MCorp, supra note 47, at 16.
68. Alan B. Miller & Jeffrey L. Tanenbaum, After MCorp, Decisions FavorRegulators, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 9, 1992, at 18, 22 [hereinafter Miller & Tanenbaum, After MCorp].
69. 11 U.S.C. § 365(o) (Supp. IV 1992) (enacted as part of the Comprehensive Thrift

and Bank Fraud Prosecution and Taxpayer Recovery Act of 1990, Title XXV of the Crime
Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2522(c), 104 Stat. 4789, 4866-67). The legislation was a response to the savings-and-loan crisis. See 136 CONG. REc. S17,601 (daily ed.

Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Sen. Biden).
70. 11 U.S.C. § 365(o) (Supp. IV 1992).
71. Firstcorp,973 F.2d at 246 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 681(I), 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
179 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 6472, 6585).
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by operation
of law, without review by or approval of the bankruptcy
72
court."

The court concluded that the obligation to cure capital reserve
73
deficiencies is a prerequisite to reorganization under Chapter 11. If
an institution is unable to "satisfy its capital obligations, then
§ 365(o) denies it the opportunity to reorganize under Chapter 11,
leaving liquidation under Chapter 7 as its only option."74
In contrast, the Second Circuit has refused to allow RTC superpowers to intrude into the bankruptcy process; the power of the
bankruptcy stay over RTC powers was upheld in In re Colonial Realty Co. 75 In a consolidated action where the RTC attempted to recover alleged fraudulent transfers from debtors' estates, the court
affirmed a district court finding that the automatic stay of bankruptcy overrides FIRREA's anti-injunction provision. 76 The court
noted the fact that "this case raises issues of first impression concerning the interaction of certain provisions of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, and the Bankruptcy Code.""" The FDIC argued that
the automatic stay had been partially repealed or limited by Congress in the Crime Control Act of 1990,18 and the court examined
this construction:
It is also presumed that Congress "'legislates with knowledge of former
related statutes,' and will expressly designate the provisions whose application it wishes to suspend, rather than leave that consequence to the uncertainties of implication compounded by the vagaries of judicial construction". ... Congress gave careful consideration to the coordination of
the banking law amendments in that statute with the existing provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code.

Given this careful attention to the harmonization of the new banking
provisions with the existing Bankruptcy Code, it becomes especially imof the bankplausible to conclude that a quite significant modification
79
ruptcy automatic stay was enacted by implication.

Quoting the district court opinion regarding the bankruptcy
automatic stay, the Second Circuit stated that the stay did not
constitute a right of a trustee, but a "'congressionally-mandated restraint that springs into existence upon the filing of a bankruptcy

72. Id. at 247.

73. Id. at 248.
74. Id.
75. 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992).
76. Id. at 127, 129-30.
77. Id. at 130 (citations omitted).
78. Pub. L. No. 101-647, 104 Stat. 4789 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.
and 12 U.S.C.).
79. ColonialRealty, 980 F.2d at 132-33 (citations omitted).
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case.', 80 Finally, in affirming the district court finding, the circuit
court concluded:
The stay imposed by § 362(a) is automatically "applicable to all entities"
without any need for the intervention of any court or ruling. Rather, the
statutory plan requires a court order for relief from the automatically imposed stay. We accordingly conclude that the § 1821(j) ban upon "court
...action.., to restrain or affect the exercise of powers or functions of the
[FDIC] as a conservator or a receiver" does not inhibit the operation of the
automatic statutory stay imposed by § 362(a). 8 1

The District Court of Massachusetts has also been successful in
preventing the FDIC from circumventing a bankruptcy stay. In re
Lane 2 was a case in which the court ruled that the FDIC does not
have power to foreclose on an asset while a bankruptcy stay is in effect. The FDIC, as a creditor, sought relief from the stay, conversion
from Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, and foreclosure of the debtor's property, invoking the anti-injunction provision § 1821(j) as a bar to
staying foreclosure sales. 3 The court stated that "[sluch an extraordinary interpretation of the manifested intent of Congress cannot be
sustained.""
In summary, while it appears that the Fourth Circuit has
adopted a policy of expansion of RTC powers, the Second Circuit and
some district courts have taken a more conservative approach to
extending RTC powers into what is traditionally the arena of bankruptcy proceedings. It is still an open question as to whether the
courts will continue an expansive trend in RTC superpowers as the
agency pursues the enormous task of resolving the nation's failed
thrifts.
B.

PriorityInconsistency

In a Chapter 11 proceeding, the position and priority of creditor
claims are clearly specified by statute. 5 Claims for capital mainte80. Id. at 129 (quoting Matter of Colonial Realty Co., 134 B.R. 1017, 1021 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1991)).
81. Id. at 137 (emphasis in the original) (citation omitted).
82. 136 B.R. 319 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
83. Id. at 319-20.
84. Id. at 321.
85. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) provides in pertinent part (prior to the
1990 addition of an eighth priority):
(a) The following expenses and claims have priority in the following order:
(1) First, administrative expenses... and any fees and charges
assessed against the estate ....

(2) Second, unsecured claims allowed under § 502(f) ....
(3) Third, allowed unsecured claims for wages, salaries, or commissions, including vacation, severance, and sick leave pay ....
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nance obligations"8 were assigned eighth, and lowest, priority by the
Thrift and Bank Fraud Act in 1990.7 However, the same legislation
calls for immediate cure of capital maintenance deficits.88 In the
statutory bankruptcy priority scheme, claims for the cure of capital
maintenance obligations assume a lower priority than creditors'
claims, whereas the addition of § 365(o) requires an "immediate"
cure, creating an apparent inconsistency within Title 11.
Acknowledging this inconsistency, the Fourth Circuit in Firstcorp speculated on the intersection between § 365(o) and § 507 regarding the appropriate priority to give claims for capital mainte(4) Fourth, allowed unsecured claims for contributions to an employee benefit plan ....
(5) Fifth, allowed unsecured claims of persons ... engaged in the
production or raising of grain... or engaged as a United States fisherman ....
(6) Sixth, allowed unsecured claims of individuals, to the extent of
$900 for each such individual, arising from the deposit, before the
commencement of the case, of money in connection with the purchase,
lease, or rental of property, or the purchase of services, for the personal, family, or household use of such individuals, that were not delivered or provided.
(7) Seventh, allowed unsecured claims of governmental units ....
Id.; see infra note 88 and accompanying text.
86. FIRREA provides for ongoing evaluation of the adequacy of an insured depository institution's capital structure, and failure to maintain an adequate capital structure
results in restrictions and/or limitations on an association's activities. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(s)
(Supp. V 1993) (minimum capital requirements); id. 1464(t) (Supp. V 1993) (capital standards); id. § 1464(t)(6) (Supp. V 1993) (consequences of failing to comply with capital
standards). Capital maintenance is regulated by 12 C.F.R. § 325 (1992).
87. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2522(d), 104 Stat. 4789, 4867
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (Supp. V 1993) provides:
(8) Eighth, allowed unsecured claims based upon any commitment by the
debtor to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the
Currency, or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or their
predecessors or successors, to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution.
Id.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(o) (Supp. V 1993), providing in full:
In a case under chapter 11 of this title, the trustee shall be deemed to have
assumed (consistent with the debtor's other obligations under section 507), and
shall immediately cure any deficit under, any commitment by the debtor to the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Resolution Trust Corporation, the
Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Comptroller of the Currency, or
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or its predecessors or
successors, to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution, and any
claim for a subsequent breach of the obligations thereunder shall be entitled to
priority under section 507. This subsection shall not extend any commitment
that would otherwise be terminated by any act of such an agency.
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nance breaches that occur during reorganization, but declined to resolve the issue.89 However, it is clear under Firstcorpthat the Fourth
Circuit considers breaches of capital maintenance requirements existing at the time of Chapter 11 filing to be governed by § 365(o) and
to require immediate cure.
C.

The Creditors'Position

Unlike the Bankruptcy Code, FIRREA gives the RTC wide discretion in determining creditor claims. In addition, the strength of
RTC's power to repudiate contracts makes it less than clear just
what position a creditor holds in a resolution scheme.
Chapter 11 imposes on management additional fiduciary obligations to creditors, and the interests of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors.' Chapter 11 equity policy includes the notion that senior claimants have rights to assets that are
superior to shareholders' rights. 9 ' There is no equivalent provision or
accommodation for creditors' rights in FIRREA. With the implementation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1991 (FDICIA),92 the FDIC and the RTC are required
the least costly of possible resolution methods for a failed
to adopt
93
thrift.
RTC is empowered to disaffirm or repudiate any burdensome
contracts or leases entered into before appointment of a conservator
or receiver,94 and this authority is among the most controversial
provisions because of its apparent application to non-executory contracts.9 5 The receiver/conservator is "given broad discretion in decid89. Firstcorp,973 F.2d at 248 n.4.
90. Martin J. Bienenstock, Once in Bankruptcy, Whose Company Is It Anyway?, in 2
CURRENT DEVEVELOPMENTS IN BANKRUPTCY & REORGANIZATION 1991, at 667, 679 (PLI
COM. L. & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES No. 573, 1991); Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355 (1985) (observing that "bankruptcy
causes fundamental changes in the nature of corporate relationships. One of the painful
facts of bankruptcy is that the interests of shareholders become subordinated to the interests of creditors").
91. Bienenstock, supranote 90, at 684.
92. Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
93. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4) (Supp. V 1993); see Stephen M. Huber, The FederalDeposit
Insurance CorporationImprovement Act of 1991, 109 BANKING L.J. 300, 302-03 (1992).
Previously, the RTC could adopt any choice that was less costly than liquidation. Id.
94. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1) (Supp. V 1993); see Daniel B. Gail & Joseph J. Norton, A
Decade's Journeyfrom "Deregulation"to "SupervisoryRegulation": The FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 BUS. LAW. 1103, 1136 (1990).
95. Tucker et al., supra note 4, at 31:
FIRREA's contract repudiation provision is controversial because of its apparent
application to non-executory contracts. While the RTC has conceded that it is
not empowered to repudiate contracts that have been fully performed by all
parties, it maintains that it may repudiate contracts under which a savings as-
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ing whether to repudiate a given contract."' If RTC has the power to
repudiate non-executory contracts, as it apparently does, organizations will naturally have concerns about doing business with a
troubled institution,9 7 which could further inhibit an institution's
ability to maintain solvency.
An even bigger question looms on the horizon regarding the capability of business organizations to operate profitably, should they
happen to be a subsidiary or affiliate of a vulnerable savings institution. Reliable and permanent creditor relationships are essential
to businesses in all industries. The repudiation threat is a worrisome problem for creditors of failed institutions and creditors of
subsidiaries of institutions in precarious condition. Unfortunately,
there has not yet been enough litigation to firmly establish the
boundaries of the RTC repudiation powers.9 8
As a receiver, RTC has authority to determine claims9 9 and express authority to disallow "any portion of any claim by a creditor or
claim of security, preference, or priority which is not proved to the
satisfaction of the receiver." 10 After a creditor's claim is filed, the
RTC is required to approve or disapprove the claim within 180
days. 1 1 If denied, the claimant may pursue an administrative appeal
or file a suit in federal court based on the claim.0 2
Liability for repudiation of contracts is limited to actual direct
compensatory damages measured as of the date of the appointment
of the conservator or receiver, and liability is expressly excluded for
punitive or exemplary
damages, lost profits or opportunity, or pain
10 3
suffering.
and
FIRREA also codified the common law D'Oench Duhme doctrine' ° established by the Supreme Court in 1942,105 which estops a
sociation has outstanding obligations, notwithstanding completed performance
by other parties to the contract.
Id. (citing Gibson v. RTC, 750 F. Supp. 1565, 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1990)).
96. Elizabeth C. Yen, Banking Decisions: ContractRepudiation by the FDIC Following a Bank Closing,109 BANKING L.J. 373, 375 (1992).
97. Tucker et al., supra note 4, at 31-32.
98. Mark Simpson, Scaling Back F2RRFA FederalJudges Begin to PlaceLimits on
RTC's ConservatorshiplReceivershipPowers, 25 GA. L. REV. 1375, 1393 (1991); see generally John L. Douglas, RepudiationPowersAre at Issue Again, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 11, 1993,
at 20 (discussing RTC's power to repudiate secured obligations).
99. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3) (Supp. V 1993).
100. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(D). There is no statutory clarification of the standard of proof
required, and the RTC has made disallowances subjectively. This approach is consistent
with the overall grant of powers to the RTC, which includes a high degree of discretion in
policy implementation.
101. Id. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i).
102. Id. § 1821(d)(6)(A); see Simpson, supra note 98, at 1403-05.
103. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(3)(A), (B); see generally Gail & Norton, supranote 94, at 1136.
104. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e).
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debtor from asserting defenses based on side or secret agreements.
The statute establishes four requirements for a valid agreement:
that it be (i) in writing, (ii) executed by the financial institution and
the obligor contemporaneously with the acquisition of the asset by
the financial institution, (iii) approved by the institution's board of
directors or loan committee, and (iv) continuously a part of the institution's records. 1°6 The FIRREA anti-injunction provision..7 completes this comprehensive statutory scheme.'
The RTC as conservator or receiver succeeds by operation of
law to all rights, titles, powers and privileges of the institution and
its stockholders, members, account holders, depositors, officers and
directors with respect to the assets of the institution.0 9 Unlike the
equitable approach employed in bankruptcy proceedings, judicial
rulings such as Landmark could create significant problems for
other creditors who will have to wait their turn behind the RTC.
Landmark would seem to indicate that the Fourth Circuit has
adopted the position that the RTC can take control of the assets of
thrift subsidiaries and liquidate them even if nothing is left for
creditors. However, the Second Circuit decision in Colonial Realty
calls into question the validity of using FIRREA's anti-injunction
provision as a tool to extract assets from the bankruptcy realm.
The Landmark decision should be worrisome to creditors of all
thrift subsidiaries. Creditors of business concerns ordinarily assume
they are engaged in normal business relationships that are governed
by commercial laws and remedies," 0 and they could perceive a
higher level of risk in doing business with an organization where
their interests may not be protected by the traditional equity principles of bankruptcy policies.
Perceived increase in risk could result in creditors' unwillingness to deal with thrift subsidiary organizations or an adjustment to
the terms of the relationship to reflect such risk. By giving inequitable preferential treatment to the RTC, courts may exacerbate the
problem. This approach deals only with the "symptoms of the disease" by trying to reduce the costs associated with resolving the
thrift crisis. It may have a modest budgetary impact but does not
attack the fundamental problems which cause thrift failures."' In
the long run, it may be even more dangerous to succumb to the
105. D'Oench, Dubnie & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
106. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (Supp. V 1993).
107. Id. § 1821(j).
108. Tucker et al., supra note 4, at 11.
109. 12 U.S.C. §.1821(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
110. Douglas, RTC's Powers, supra note 45, at 19.
111. John L. Douglas, DepositorPreference May Harm Banks, NATIL L.J., Aug. 23,
1993, at 18, 22.
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temptation to fashion crisis solutions by dealing with symptoms instead of underlying problems.

m1-.

ANTI-INJUNCTION PROVISIONS

Equitable relief in the form of injunctions have traditionally
been employed to correct jurisdictional or procedural inadequacies
in the judicial system. An analogous jurisdictional conflict exists
between the Bankruptcy Code and the anti-injunction provision of
the Internal Revenue Code." The Eighth Circuit created a bankruptcy exception to the federal tax anti-injunction statute, reasoning
that bankruptcy judges hold equity power over the federal tax system." 3 The court found that bankruptcy proceedings take precedence over general tax policy "inasmuch as Congress has evidenced
an intention to enact a complete scheme governing bankruptcy
which overrides the general policy represented by the 'anti-injunction' act.""' Although the Eighth Circuit position has been both followed" 5 and rejected," 6 it stands as a bankruptcy equity exception to
the federal tax anti-injunction provision. 1 7 A similar bankruptcy
equity exception to RTC's anti-injunction powers would do much to
build confidence in the creditor community and assure the best
chance of successful reorganization for business subsidiaries of savings institutions.
When injunctive relief is blocked, as in the FIRREA anti-injunction provision,"" an effective means of dealing with jurisdictional deficiencies is lost."9 In order to justify the necessity of antiinjunction provisions, "something special" must require an additional measure of protection. 20 Given the scope of RTC superpowers,
112. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (1982) ("Except as provided ... no suit for the purpose of
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by
any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed.").
113. Bostwick v. United States, 521 F.2d 741 (8th Cir. 1975); see generally J. Wendell Bayles, Jurisdictionin Bankruptcy to Contest Tax Liability and Arrest Collection Efforts, 26 WASHBURN L.J. 423, 427-29 (1987).

114. Bostwick, 521 F.2d at 744.
115. See In re O.H. Lewis Co., 40 Bankr. 531 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1984); In re Datoin
Sys., 37 Bankr. 690 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Jan Co., 30 Bankr. 831 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1983); In re H & R Ice Co., 24 Bankr. 28 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982); In re Major Dynamics,
Inc., 14 Bankr. 969 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981).
116. See In re Becker's Motor Transp., 632 F.2d 242 (Bankr. 3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981); In re Campbell Enters., 66 Bankr. 200 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986).
117. See Bayles, supranote 113, at 427 nn.30 & 31.
118. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j) (Supp. V 1993).
119. See Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1022
(1965).
120. Cf. Tax Injunction Act, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 932 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1341
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there is some question as to whether FIRREA represents the extraordinary circumstances that demand the blocking of equitable
injunctive relief. It is not at all clear that "something special" in the
nature of overriding policy goals requires this additional measure of
protection.
In addition to the explicit anti-injunction provision at section
1821(j), section 1818(i)(1) of FIRREA also operates as an anti-injunction provision.121 The Supreme Court based its decision in
MCorp on Section 1818(i)(1), holding that this specific provision was
by the more general provision governing bankruptcy
not superseded
22
proceedings.
The Third Circuit has ruled that district courts do not have the
power to enjoin activity by the RTC where the Corporation is colorably acting within its enumerated powers. In Gross v. Bell Savings
Bank,'2 the Gross brothers were former officers of Bell Savings
1
Bank in Pennsylvania, for which RTC was appointed the receiver. 2
The district court determined that it had the power to consider injunctive relief requiring the RTC to release nearly $500,000 of pension and profit-sharing assets in its control.2' The Third Circuit
found that a federal court does not have power to enjoin RTC's behavior in its role as receiver or conservator; 26 however, federal
courts do have the ability to restrain the RTC where the Corporation
is acting clearly outside its statutory powers, stating "[o]f course, the
RTC's power is not limitless." 2 7 The court determined that because
Congress had crafted a damages remedy for those who allege harm
from RTC's exercise of power, 12 "the district court does not have the
ability to enjoin activity by the RTC where the Corporation is colorably acting within its enumerated powers."' 9
The Third Circuit has also denied injunctive relief when the
RTC acted in accordance with its statutory powers, even where the
RTC's action was in violation of another statutory scheme. In Rosa
v. RTC,3 0 beneficiaries of an ERISA pension plan brought an action
(1988)) (establishing a federal policy of noninterference in matters of state taxation);
Diane P. Wood, Fine-Tuning Judicial Federalism A Proposal for Reform of the Anti-In-

junction Act, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 293 (arguing that the anti-injunction act protects
the basic structure of federal/state relations).
121. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1) (Supp. V 1993); see supra note 55.
122. 112 S. Ct. 459, 465 (1991).
123. 974 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1992).
124. Id. at 404.
125. Id. at 404,406.
126. Id. at 408.
127. Id. at 407.
128. Id. at 408.
129. Id.
130. 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1991).
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against the RTC as receiver/conservator challenging lack of contributions and wrongful termination of an ERISA plan on a retroactive
basis without 100% vesting, in violation of the plan and ERISA."'
The district court had enjoined termination of the plan and ordered
payment of contributions due and owing. 1 2 While construing
§ 1821(j) broadly in Rosa, the Third Circuit discussed the possibility
of narrower constructions:
In reaching our conclusion that some portions of the district court's order were prohibited by § 1821(j), we emphasize that the effect of that section in this case is solely to prevent a particular remedy in the interest of
allowing RTC as receiver or conservator promptly to perform its important

functions in dealing with the savings and loan crisis. It does not deprive
plaintiffs, if wronged, of any other remedy that would not "restrain or af-

fect" the exercise of the receiver's or conservator's powers or functions. We
naturally express no opinion as to the alleged wrongfulness of RTC's con-

duct.
Moreover, we do not mean to be understood as saying that an order restraining or affecting RTC's exercise of its powers as receiver or conservator could never issue. Indeed, courts have recognized
exceptions to provi1
sions worded even more broadly than § 1821(j). 33

Not all courts have construed the anti-injunction provision as
broadly as the Third Circuit. In Cummings PropertiesManagement
v. FDIC, the District Court of Massachusetts successfully enjoined
the FDIC from removing an automatic teller machine from a lessor's
premises after determining that the lessor was likely to prevail on
the merits and would be harmed irreparably if the machine was removed." In its opinion, the court expressed the view that "Section
1821(j) does not elevate the FDIC to the position of a sacred cow
which may graze upon the rights of others at will, unchecked by the
courts."'3 5 The court was troubled by the implications of a position
that would allow the FDIC to pursue its mission without any accountability to the judicial system." 5
The Southern District of New York has ruled that FIRREA
does not give the RTC power to repudiate statutory tenancies and
that FIRREA does not preempt New York's rent control law or rent
stabilization law (i.e., the RTC cannot evict tenants from rent-con131. Id. at 390. The plaintiffs claimed the termination violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053 &
1082 (1988). Id.
132. Id.

133. Id. at 399-400.
134. 786 F. Supp. 144 (D.Mass. 1992), vacated and appeal dismissed per parties'
settlement, 1992 WL 366909 (1st Cir., Sept. 1, 1992).

135. Id. at 146.
136. John L. Douglas, FDIC'sPowers Face Growing Challenge, NAT'L L.J., July 5,
1993, at 18 [hereinafter Douglas, FDIC'sPowers].
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trolled apartments). 3 ' However, the RTC distinguishes this decision
because RTC powers were construed under FIRREA's repudiation
provisions, rather than the anti-injunction provision.3
The limits of FIRREA's anti-injunction provision will be defined
by the courts. In the past, courts have granted injunctive relief in
the face of similar anti-injunction statutes and have refused to allow
agencies to run roughshod over the rights of aggrieved parties. 1 9 It
is necessary to ascertain under what circumstances injunctive relief
will become available. The agency is not authorized to act unlawfully. When it acts contrary to law and an adequate remedy is not
available through the administrative claims process, the courts
should intervene. 4
CONCLUSION

Since the enactment of FIRREA in 1989 there has been a pattern of steady expansion of RTC superpowers. The savings and loan
crisis which triggered the enactment of FIRREA is perceived to be a
threat to the banking system, and it is generally acknowledged that
the RTC must have enough power to deal effectively with the crisis.
However, it is also critical to preserve the bankruptcy system as a
robust and reliable method of dealing with ongoing business affairs.
These two components of the economy do not operate independently
and when they intersect, serious consideration must be given to the
long-term consequences of specific crisis solutions that challenge jurisdictional boundaries.
With the complex and often redundant FIRREA, Congress has
enacted "a regulatory structure for thrift and banking institutions
that reacts to the immediate problems of the failed thrift industry
and its federal insurance fund, rather than a more functional, efficient, and far-sighted structure." As time goes on, the FDIC will
continue to exercise and expand its powers, restructuring financial
institutions and disposing of assets. The "regulator" has assumed
the characteristics and functions of a business enterprise and is
making operational, as well as regulatory, decisions in a significant
segment of the banking industry. "FIRREA has transformed the
FDIC and its related adjuncts into what will be the largest real estate corporation in the world, with vast powers to restructure troubled financial institutions and to dispose of their assets."
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

RTC v. Diamond, 801 F. Supp. 1152, 1160 & n.3, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Donovan, supra note 29, at 29.
Douglas, FDIC'sPowers,supra note 136, at 21.
Id.
Gail & Norton, supra note 94, at 1224.
Id. at 1226.
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The Fourth Circuit has extended RTC receivership powers over
failed thrifts to their non-bank affiliates in Chapter 11.143 At least in
this circuit, the trend appears to be a body of law that is evolving at
the expense of Chapter 11 creditors. The basic purpose of FIRREA,
to protect the capital base of depository institutions, is overtaking
the basic goals of bankruptcy-equitable distribution of debtors' assets to satisfy creditors' claims with an ultimate objective of rehabilitating debtors' businesses.'" The expansion of RTC superpowers
at the expense of the reliability of the bankruptcy system could create future problems as serious as the crisis currently being resolved
through FIRREA.
The bankruptcy system is a vital part of the national economy,
and there is some degree of risk in inhibiting its efficiency and effectiveness in the process of resolving a temporary crisis in the thrift
industry. The orderly administration of bankruptcies has played an
essential role in the evolution of our market economy. Bankruptcy is
a proven framework within which the economy deals equitably and
predictably with financial crises of individual entities, and Chapter
11 is a powerful tool for the orderly reorganization of businesses experiencing financial difficulties. The bankruptcy process should not
suffer erosion of its powers in the struggle to deal with a systemic financial crisis in one segment of the economy. Effective institutional
changes and remedies are unquestionably needed to resolve the
thrift industry crisis. However, interference with an effective bankruptcy system designed to resolve individual crises is not necessarily
a part of the ultimate solution to systemic deficiencies within the
banking system.
We must look beyond the current crisis when fashioning solutions, even in the face of extraordinary problems. What might be the
next crisis to precipitate an intrusion into the bankruptcy sphere?
The autonomy and integrity of the bankruptcy system must be preserved, and the legislature and courts should be cautious in subordinating its authority to crises of the moment. It is at least questionable whether there is long-term benefit in undermining the
bankruptcy system to save costs in treating the symptoms of failures
in a sector of the banking industry.

143. Miller & Tanenbaum, Beyond MCorp, supranote 47, at 20.
144. Miller & Tanenbaum, After MCorp, supranote 68, at 18.

